Tag Archives: Donna Haraway

Notes on How I Intend to Not Just Watch the World Burn

Prior to this course I had had no exposure to the Environmental Humanities whatsoever. I assumed it was field of scholars doing nature writing, reading Annie Dillard, or, I suppose, contemplating the hermeneutics of foliage. Therefore, I thought, it has no relevance to my research. I am delighted, if not really surprised to find I was quite wrong. Every text in this course has opened a new perspective for me, as I learned that the Environmental Humanities is not only legitimate but actually useful to me. More than any other text, though, I keep coming back to Donna Haraway’s Staying with the Trouble. To explain why Haraway has resonated with me, let me first, as briefly as possible, touch on my aims and methods as a scholar of literature.

I research the material cultural history of literature and practices of reading and writing. My methodology tends to draw on Book History, Media Studies, and Textual Studies. Texts are always encountered as material objects. I like to think about texts therefore with an eye toward production and use. Textual production and use are always deeply interrelated. I mean a variety of things by this, but to avoid writing my dissertation in a blog post, allow me to home in on a single instance: one use for a text is the production of a new text. This is as much true when Seth Grahame-Smith added his own words to Jane Austen’s to produce Pride and Prejudice and Zombies as when a young Emily Dickinson read poetry by the Brontës. Moreover, if we consider production beyond mere composition, it becomes clear that many more hands were involved in making the thing we read than just the author’s. What I’m getting at here, is that my broader interest is a decentering of the author, not à la Barthes as a rhetorical or logical position intended to open up interpretive possibilities, but as a way of reading intertextually and revealing the labor hidden or elided by an “author-”centered approach. This is, make no mistake, a political project. I am resisting a neo-liberal discourse of individualism.

I was elated, then, to discover, amidst Haraway’s admittedly fruity prose, concepts that seemed to line up strikingly with my own work. Take sympoiesis, which Haraway learned from Katie King, who in turn learned it from M. Beth Dempster. Sympoiesis, Haraway explains (by quoting Dempster), describes “collectively-producing systems that do not have self-defined spatial or temporal boundaries. Information and control are distributed among components. The systems are evolutionary and have the potential for surprising change” (33). What have I been moving toward if not a sympoietic model of literary production? Haraway seems to call to me to push what I’ve been thinking about even further. Her literary form enacts what it describes. She embeds herself in tentacular networks of ideas and writers. Haraway’s SF [string figures, “speculative fabulation, science fiction, science fact, speculative feminism, soin de ficelle” (31)] is both a way of thinking the world and telling the world. “SF is storytelling and fact telling; it is the patterning of possible worlds and possible times, material-semiotic worlds, gone, here, and yet to come” (31). Haraway marries cultural criticism and cultural production; that is to say, she positions interpretation in a reflexive relationship with what is normally thought of as creation [a problematic term in Haraway’s cosmology and indeed in my own model of shared labor]. Moreover, her model of sympoiesis emphasizes distributive authorship and distributive responsibility. Her form both interrogates and postulates (and then she closes with fiction!). She makes different syntactic, semantic, and aesthetic choices than I certainly ever will but this way of thinking and doing scholarship (or theory or philosophy) seems more alive than almost anything I’ve encountered.

At heart, what I find so compelling (or maybe just validating) about Haraway is that it makes me feel like my work could be connected to something more significant than the academy. In the last few years academia has come to feel like a particular pair of panels from K.C. Green’s Gunshow that are quite popular online:

K. C. Green Gunshow

Only it’s worse than that, because some of us have decided this is not fine and we seem helpless to communicate the urgency of that fact with anyone but ourselves. It is helpful to be reminded that “it matters what ideas we use to think other ideas” (34), that our work does not need to carry the weight of the world, that we can become together, and move toward a way of working, writing, and doing that has stakes for confronting issues like nuclear power/proliferation and climate change. Not only does Haraway expand my conception of what scholarship can accomplish but my conception of how we might perform and undertake scholarship altogether.

Top: “Spawn of the Stars” by Sofyan Syarief: DeviantartArtstationBehanceInstagram [CC BY-SA 3.0] Please note that Haraway’s “ChthuIucene” has nothing whatsoever to do with Cthulhu, and you are silly for assuming it might. However, I, for one, am looking forward to abandoning both the Anthropocene and the Chthulucene for the coming Cthulhucene, when the blessed cradle of madness can at last rock humanity to its longed-for slumber. Ph’nglui mglw’nafh Cthulhu R’lyeh wgah’nagl fhtagn

The Question Isn’t How, It’s When

As we’ve discussed, nuclear disaster results in strange entanglements of time and place. From the deep time of radioactive decay to the affinity between Fukushima and Chernobyl, there is a simultaneity and a deferral that are held in close contact within the structure of nuclear futures. We live in contact with multiple time scales. Fears around radioactive waste and climate change bring it into sharper focus but, deeptime is in the rocks around us, the sun, systems of erosion and deposition, fossil fuels, the list continuing ad naseaum.  In Haraway’s reframing that “we are compost, not posthuman” there echoes the fact that our bodies are always already part of the process of earth-making (55). That is, caught up in the process of decay—the deferral of which haunts us.

I want to think about deferral and serialization together as terms that are reflected in the form and content of the two works we recently encountered: Dark and Ichi-F. Both works demonstrate in strange ways what is can be called thick time. Astrida Neimanis and Rachel Loewen Walker in their essay titled, “Weathering: Climate Change and the “Thick Time” of Transcorporeality”, explain thick time as being “a transcorporeal stretching between present, future, and past” that helps us “to reimagine our bodies as archives of climate and as making future climates possible” (1). Thinking in thick time is, as David Farrier suggests in his new book, Anthropocene Poetics, the “capacity to put multiple temporalities and scales within a single frame, to ‘thicken’ the present with an awareness of the other times and places” (9).

To describe the ways in which thick time is a function of deferral and serialization in these two works, I want to turn to comics theorist Scott McCloud.  McCloud describes the formal elements of narrative time in comics as operating in such a way that “Each panel of a comic shows a single moment in time. And between those frozen moments–between the panels–our minds fill in the intervening moments, creating the illusion of time and motion” (94). But time in comics is also described through the unfolding of sound-as-text in a single panel. The instantaneous and singleness of the moment of sound can’t be taken as coinciding with the image beside it . “Just as pictures and the intervals between them create the illusion of time through closure, words introduce time by representing that which can only exist in time–sound” (95).  Closure is  “The phenomenon of observing the parts but perceiving the whole”  (63). How we rely on incomplete information to construct semantically meaningful wholes. Like glimpsing only half of a soda can and recognizing the whole label.  This can help us think of serialization and deferment in that we are presented a splintered text that resists telling a full story until assembled into a coherent whole. However, the whole still has the formal elements of time that complicate and make messy the ways that plot unfold (mirroring/affinities in Dark, the quotidian in Ichi-F). The way that both simultaneity and motion are layered within and between the static images of a panel are a perfect visual model for understanding thick time.

Ichi-F exemplifies this in depicting the process of donning clothing for clean up. Each garment is represented in fine detail along with the process of putting it on. The mask cleaning process, the taping of the wrists of the sleeves, the booties, dosimeters, along with the specifics of where to find each and how to carry and operate them. Something as quotidian as dressing is shown to be part of a larger, more intimate relationship with radioactive deep time, thickening it. The process is drawn out from panel to panel, showing each step and urging the reader to assemble all the parts of dressing into a coherent whole. All of this points to larger moments of deferral that happen in comics—that is,  the way in which content is produced through serialization. Ichi-F was, afterall, originally published in three installments before being translated and resold as one volume in the English edition.

Dark operates differently from other forms of serialized content since it lives on Netflix. As a place so entangled with the concept of binge watching, serialization takes on a different meaning here. Serialization, I would argue, is a function of content over time. However, Netflix complicates that relationship in how it releases shows and encourages viewing habits. These habits we could argue are the by-products of consumer driven content creation. The ease of making and the result of on-demand content created in the age of platform capitalism.

But Dark also confuses the unfolding of plot usual to the serial with the ability to view it in all at once (if one were to follow the ethos of Netflix, as the writer has, or almost has). I want to suggest that because content about nuclear futurity echoes the formal aspects of time in comics, that we can read Dark in a similar fashion. The viewer is invited from the very beginning to give up on the assumption of time’s linearity. The narrator at the beginning most explicitly establishes a sense of thick time when they state that the distinction between “past, present, and future is an illusion” (Dark ep 1). In the same way that closure makes for continuity in comics, we can read closure in serialized media as well, both in content and form.

 


Farrier, David. Anthropocene Poetics: Deep Time, Sacrifices Zones, and Extinction, Minnesota UP, 2019.

McCloud, Scott. Understanding Comics: The invisible Art. Harper Collins, 1993.

Neimanis, Astrida and Rachel Loewen Walker, “Weathering: Climate Change and the “Thick Time” of Transcorporeality, Hypatia vol. 29, no. 3 (Summer 2014), pp. 558-575.

The king of sloppy—and stuplimity

In “The Sloppy Realities of 3.11 in Shiriagari Kotobuki’s Manga,” Mary Knighton defines stuplimity as

comical stupefaction at the sheer scale of the human-wrought crisis and our own passive impotence in the face of it. (21–22)

Here, we see that stuplimity is made up of three parts. First, a cause: we live within or in the wake of a “human-wrought crisis” of shocking magnitude. Next, an effect: we find ourselves caught in a paralyzing state of “passive impotence.” Finally, a response: we take in the grim reality of this crisis and our inability to resolve it, and we respond with “comical stupefaction.” In this way, stuplimity (a) identifies a crisis and (b) counters human impotence, all the while (c) bringing us to rethink catastrophe, in Shiriagari’s case through sloppiness and humor. It’s the sublime turned inside-out, with the object moving from environment to society, or from the natural to the artificial, and with the affect turning from terrible wonder to ludicrous horror.

By identifying a crisis or network of crises, stuplimity says something about the world we live in today. Sloppiness in particular acts as a reflection of our reality, and one that may be more mimetic than at first thought. Shiriagari argues that “‘sloppy’ things are real,” at least in part because we live and die “sloppily” (Knighton 1). As when the Japanese look for reliable information on the effects of nuclear disaster but find too much data, data that’s contradictory, or data of suspicious origin, sloppiness indicates that a single, objective truth is not possible. There is no one feeling to have or single action to take. Techniques harkening back to realism or a third-person perspective belong to the unreal for Shiriagari, in keeping with a satirical or surreal tone (7). Sloppy drawing says something about the mimetic quality of narratives as well. In life, we find no promising climax, no clean resolution, no villain responsible, and in catastrophe, too, we find that the cause belongs not to a single event or mastermind, but rather to a complicated web of banal corruption and poor planning.

This sloppy reality resonates with many of our readings this semester. Shiriagari’s representation of “malaise” (Knighton 1) and “paralysis and enervation” (8) aligns with the precarious existence Anne Allison explains in Precarious Japan. Although precarity begins with precarious employment, which is “uncertain, unpredictable, and risky” for workers (6), it spreads across all areas of life, infecting every moment and thought until our very “human condition” becomes precarious, a state of being marked by doubt and fear (9). Shiriagari places this state of being in a crisis with no end in sight, much like Robert Nixon’s concept of slow violence, which describes crises that not only unfold slowly and beneath the surface, but which also elude “tidy closure” (6). And, not unsurprisingly, this kind of mounting threat points to problems firmly embedded in neoliberalism, with its “relentless and ubiquitous economization” of everyday life, and in capitalist economies, which demand continuous (and impossible) growth (Brown 31).

Shiriagari does more than just represent these crises; he resists them, and counters the “passive impotence” that results as well. He disregards the dangers of reception, for example. Representing nuclear disaster in fiction draws controversy, especially when the means may be considered disrespectful, as is the case with humor (DiNitto). But humor does accomplish something in nuclear contexts. Comparable to the hibakusha’s struggle to communicate their experience through atomic-bomb narratives, Shiriagari responds to nuclear disaster “with new words or even a new language” through humor (Treat 30). Humor allows for a call to action, asking readers again and again to “wake up” from their malaise (Knighton 1, 23, 25, 31) and stay with the trouble, or learn “to be truly present” (Haraway 1). Without provocative and imaginative approaches to human suffering, we might never find the means to represent it. It would be easier to forget what happened at Tōhoku, and even easier to remain complacent. In Milan Kundera’s words:

the struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting. (qtd. Treat 21)

Even if Shiriagari only manages to provoke readers with the audacity of his approach, this is still an accomplishment of sorts. Indignation and anger, I would argue, are a better alternative to wishy washy feelings of uncertainty, anxiety, or disappointment. Without a catalyst, what Sianne Ngai calls ugly feelings “hum alongside the everyday” without end (Knighton 3). And Shiriagari does give us a catalyst. He combines kakusei (“stimulating humor”) and warawareru (“being reduced to laughter”) to offer readers a “new way of seeing or thinking,” and an outlet for the frustration of an open and ongoing crisis (9). This reminds me of something discussed in another one of my classes this week, on Pseudodoxia Epidemica. In Pseudodoxia, Thomas Browne argues that the production of knowledge depends on the “challenges, corrections, and propositions” of “diverging voices” (West 170). In other words, communities of difference bring us closer to the truth. Maybe the greatest challenge to representing nuclear disaster is silence—that a robust and complex conversation is not already taking place. 

As for the third piece in the stuplimitous puzzle, evoking “comical stupefaction”—well, this is what Shiriagari does best. Shiriagari’s sloppiness pushes against the “idealism” of modes like Cool Japan, and humor disrupts the “arrogance” of powers in both society and fiction (Knighton 8). Shiriagari encourages readers to see and think in new ways by entertaining paradoxical or unsettling conclusions. The family of Defenders, for example, bring us to acknowledge that the conditions of modern life are not safe or in control. The episode “Hope” personifies radioactive materials rather than vilifying them. This reveals the vibrancy of all matter, even nuclear, in its capacity “to act as quasi agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own” (Bennett viii). When a character in “The Village by the Sea” protests the return of electricity, exclaiming that “he had never been able to see so many stars,” Shiriagari doesn’t glorify a way of life without technology. He reminds us that we’re forced to encounter and adapt to change all the time, and that any solution to catastrophe may be temporary (Knighton 7).

The twin old geezers confront nuclear realities particularly well, I think. Episode 2 emphasizes that it isn’t nuclear energy that has changed, but us, its keepers and neighbors, who have failed to see nuclear energy (which was once, and in some circles still is, the champion of green energy) to its full potential. And episode 3 prompts readers to recognize that the nuclear crisis is, to put it simply, complicated. As pictured below, the episode imagines reactions on either end of the spectrum as ludicrous, short-sighted, and often counter-productive. The jabbering of birds, nothing more than white noise. The sky may be falling, or everything may be fine, sure, but Shiriagari would have us regard nuclear disaster from somewhere in between, first suspending dis/belief. Like Donna Haraway, he would have us stay with the trouble: at times “stir up potent response,” and at others, “settle troubled waters” (1).

Shiriagari Kotobuki, from Kawakudari futago no oyaji (“The Twin Old Geezers Go Downriver,” Episode 3), in Ano hi kara no manga: 2011.3.11, 2011 (Manga Ever Since: 2011.3.11)

Anti-Natal Futures

As a queer person with no interest in raising children, I feel a personal stake in Sarah Ensor’s conception of avuncular futurity—an ecological perspective grounded in “nonreproductive (and indirectly invested) figures” (410). Ensor’s “spinster stands in a kind of slanted or oblique relationship to the linear, vertical paradigms of transmission that govern familiar notions of futurity” (416). As the strange aunt of the future, the spinster reminds us of contingencies, paths not taken, alternate relations, networks of non-linear being. Reading Ensor, I felt invited to imagine myself as the future’s confirmed bachelor uncle. And yet I wonder now if that is quite right. The spinster is, after all, specifically female and exclusively so in Ensor’s paper.

The spinster, we might say, is legible as a kind of social outsider precisely insofar as she has been abstracted from time. She becomes a spinster only once it has been determined that she likely has no marriageable future; when that happens, however, she also comes to have no past—or at least no past in which a future, or the desire for one, ever existed. (We need think here only of the oddly virginal resonances of the phrase old maid, which erases the spinster’s lived past in favor of a kind of ahistorical, perpetual innocence. (414)

It is the gendered social expiration date that in part enables the spinster’s out-of-time perspective and role. There is no male correlate to “old maid.” (Interesting that there is too no aunt correlate to avuncular.) Indeed, the winking “confirmed bachelor” suggests not a misfortune that befalls but a choice, a willful headlong orientation toward the (childless) future. Wikipedia offers a little serendipity here. “Confirmed Bachelor” redirects to an article called “He never married,” which is described as “a code phrase used by obituary writers in the United Kingdom as a euphemism for the deceased having been homosexual.” With “he never married,” often the last words of an obituary, the subject is identified as queer at the same time that he is written out of the present and the future. These are final words that relegate queerness to a past that is dead and disconnected. My point with this response is not to discredit or even really critique Ensor’s spinster futurity. Rather, I wonder what other kinds of queer futurity we might find that, like Ensor’s, reject or remediate the antisocial turn in queer scholarship. Further I think highlighting gender makes clear the feminist potential in Ensor’s work for opening modes of female futurity that do not depend on reproductive capacity. Spinster futurity, in resisting “do it for the children” kinds of environmental discourse with its oblique perspective, also opens up space to think about complex, slow, or cumulative environmental happenings outside of a neat chain of causality. In this way it seems almost the perfect match for orienting ourselves with respect to Rob Nixon’s conception of slow violence, perhaps unsurprising given both authors’ indebtedness to Rachel Carson.

In Staying with the Trouble Donna Haraway offers another reorientation toward the environmental future. Her troubled and troubling conception of the Chthulucene is similarly aligned with resistance to simple cause and effect environmentalism. Haraway’s exigence more than anything seems to be a profound awareness of limits—the limits of our ways of thinking, the limits of our narratives, the limits of our power as individuals and as a species. Haraway’s sympoietic tentacular chthonic Gaia is so impossibly complex that thinking only about one actor, element, or problem is laughably inadequate. She implicitly questions what the goal of environmentalism should be. It cannot end, she seems suggest; the chthonic ones laugh in the face of discrete goals. Her sense of a world that becomes-with is intimately connected to the Chthulucene: “an ongoing temporality that resists figuration and dating and demands myriad names” (51). I sense that it is no accident that her Chthulucene resists easy definition; in the time of the Chthulucene, present, future, and past seem to lose relevance to a billion different distributed and interdependent nows. Haraway’s embrace of “kin” over kids, a benign anti-natalism, is grounded in this profound sense of interconnectedness of time and effects as much as it is in a sense of “response-ability” for overpopulation.  In her introduction, Haraway articulates her resistance to the conception of a discrete future that leads to faith in technofixes or a sense of our efforts being “too late.” That latter futurity has a real danger of paralyzing activism. Haraway has done something remarkable in being able to overcome that panic without losing a sense of the urgency for action.

As in Ensor, I sense a potential in Haraway’s reorientation of the future to be able to better understand and represent slow violence. Indeed, slow violence seems positively tentacular. Taken together, Ensor and Haraway persuasively make a case for an alternative futurity being almost a pre-requisite for negotiating a less destructive relationship with the environment and, as Haraway suggests, moving us out of the Capitalocene (or perhaps the Neo-Liberalocene).

 

(“Future is so Queer” by Eltpics is licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0)